Oil & Energy Investor by Dr. Kent Moors

Is the U.S. Even Serious about Iranian Sanctions?

by | published January 17th, 2019

Donald Trump’s move to reintroduce sanctions against Iran was supposed to result in crushing economic pressure against Teheran when they were introduced at the beginning of November.

Those sanctions were to have two overarching primary objectives:

  • Impeding Iranian oil exports,
  • And preventing access to international banking and financial transfers.

The former should have directly (and quite adversely) impacted the flow of revenue to Iran. The latter was to make the export of any product that requires foreign exchange much more difficult.

Well, that hasn’t worked out quite as expected…

The result of some very suspect decisions (or lack thereof) by Washington.

First, after building up some “suspense,” at the eleventh hour the White House granted a 180-day exemption to the eight primary importers of Iranian oil.

That means the net effect on reducing the movement of Iran’s oil is virtually nil.

But it was always the sanctions on global banking that involved a more serious immediate threat to Iran.

It is here that perhaps the most telling attempt by the U.S. to make some political noise, but not really upset the global apple cart, is revealed.

Let me explain

The Man Who Saved the World: Part II

by | published January 16th, 2019

When the Soviets chose to go down this path, they did so under the utmost secrecy, using an elaborately compartmentalized operation based on “maskiroyka” – denial and deception. The gambit, code-named “Operation Anadyr,” started in July 1962, with the arrival in Cuba of missile-construction experts identified as “irrigation specialists,” “machine operators” and “agricultural specialists.”

It was in August 1962 when the Pentagon began suspecting the Soviet Union might be moving nukes into Cuba. Overflights by Lockheed U-2 spy planes discovered so-called “SAMS” (surface-to-air antiaircraft missiles) arranged in the same patterns the Soviet military used to protect ballistic-missile sites on its home soil.

Other intelligence reports revealed the existence of Russian-built MiG-21 fighter jets and Il-28 light bombers.

Unbeknownst to Washington, the first consignment of R-12 medium-range ballistic missiles arrived the night of Sept. 8, followed by another batch eight days later. Known in the West by its NATO designation SS-4 Sandal, the R-12 was a one-stage, megaton-capable missile with an effective range of 1,200 miles.

The plan was to build nine sites – six for R-12 medium-range missiles and three for long-range R-14 (SS-5 Skean) with a range of 2,800 miles.

Although the United States had been running surveillance flights over Cuba ever since the Bay of Pigs fiasco, several problems emerged.

In late August, an erroneous overflight of the USSR’s Sakhalin Island by a U.S. Air Force spy plane – followed by a Mainland China shootdown of a U.S.-supplied/Taiwan-operated U-2 nine days later – prompted the Pentagon to put the Cuba overflights on temporary hiatus.

Attempts to use spy satellites to image the heavily forested interior of Cuba were thwarted by cloud cover and general haze.

When the U-2 spy plane flights were finally reauthorized on Oct. 9, there was a five-week period historians refer to as a “Photo Gap.”

And the cost was high.

On Oct. 14, U.S. Air Force Maj. Richard Heyser flew a U-2 over Western Cuba – and when the Central Intelligence Agency’s National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) reviewed the 928 images he’d captured, officials were stunned at what they found.


In Cuba.

President Kennedy was informed the morning of Oct. 16 – starting the clock on the “13 days” that define the Cuban Missile Crisis